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Abstract: Resnik’s argument relies upon an undefended and unjustified
overvaluation of liberty. First, he overlooks some important arguments in favour
of restrictions to liberty, and his consideration of the two he does review is unfair;
second his account grossly overestimates the autonomy of our food choices; and
lastly his mechanism for balancing liberty against other concerns involves an
illicit double counting of the weight of individual liberty.
Resnik argues that banning trans fats (TFs) from restaurants is unjustifiable at the
present time as it is too restrictive of human freedom. We agree with Resnik that
liberty is an important value, one that ought to be protected and promoted.
However, his argument relies upon an undefended and unjustified overvaluation
of liberty. First, he overlooks some important arguments in favour of restrictions
to liberty, and his consideration of the two he does review is unfair; second his
account grossly overestimates the autonomy of our food choices; and lastly his
mechanism for balancing liberty against other concerns involves an illicit double
counting of the weight of individual liberty.
1. Resnik on banning Trans Fats
Resnik considers only two arguments in favour of banning TFs, both of which he3
describes as consequentialist in form: TF bans promote public health, and a ban
would bring about economic cost savings. He claims that these are the ‘main’
arguments in favour of a ban, but provides no reasons for this claim.
Resnik responds to the first argument by pointing out that we have made mistakes
in food policy in the past. It is true that regulation – in the case of food as
elsewhere – frequently fails to achieve a desired goal. However, this is a general
problem with regulation, and we have no reason to think that decisions about the
regulation of TFs are any more uncertain than anything else. It is important to note
that there are also costs to not regulating: if a foodstuff is in fact dangerous,
delaying regulating it on the grounds of uncertainty about the exact effects of a
ban will mean people will, with certainty, be harmed unnecessarily. Given the
empirical facts as presented by Resnik himself there is a strong argument for
action in this case.
Resnik’s response to his second ‘main’argument, the economic justification for
intervention, is to suggest that the projected cost saving are dubious. We agree that
the calculations here are complex and contentious. However, Resnik is hardly fair.
Whilst costs may provide grounds for a ban, no one (to our knowledge) relies
purely upon health cost-savings as an argument for banning TFs. Costs are of
course relevant, but policy is not, and ought not to be, based on appeal to cost
savings alone. Benefits (and other moral considerations) also need to be weighed
in deliberations about policy. If this is done, even if economic costs of a TF ban
are higher, there may still be good reasons to act.
More generally, Resnik seems to presuppose that consequentialist grounds will
provide the main support for public health regulation. This has two problems.
First, it is not true. The most common arguments in favour of a ban are actually4
based around harm prevention and reduction (reasons that have bite at both the
individual and population level). Whilst these reasons may be considered by a
consequentialist, you don’t need to be a consequentialist to see their importance.
Second, there are also recognisably rights-based justifications for public health
regulations. On such views, the state has an obligation to take reasonable steps to
protect its citizens from various types of risk to their health, and citizens are
wronged as individuals if the state fails to do this. Such a moral view is implicit in
the claim – signed up to by the vast majority of countries – that there is a human
right to the highest attainable standard of heath. (CESCR 2000) This type of view
would have been important for Resnik to consider, as it implies that it is not just
incursions into liberty that we must be able to justify to each individual whose
liberty is infringed, but also failures to remove threats to health from the
environment.
2. Choices to eat unhealthy food
Many people do have preferences for unhealthy food. But at the same time many
people have preferences for an environment in which the food that is easily
available for them to buy is healthy. Hence, the first thing to notice here is that
whichever way we choose to regulate (or refuse to regulate) TFs will involve
overriding the autonomous preferences of some citizens. Making policy decisions
in circumstances of such disagreement is difficult, but there is no good reason to
presume that inaction per se is to be preferred (Grill 2009).
How should we interpret choices to eat unhealthy food? Presumably unhealthy
foods are rarely considered worthy of choice simply for the reason that they are
unhealthy: they are generally chosen in spite of the fact that they are unhealthy.
Some choices for unhealthy foods are autonomous – choices which are in line
with what the person would choose if they were deciding lucidly given their
deepest values. Other choices for unhealthy food are not autonomous – for5
example where someone is unaware of the risks of TFs, or discounts the risks of
future coronary heart disease in a way they would on closer reflection think
irrational. Where possible, it is certainly worth trying to address this epistemic
deficit by providing relevant information and labelling.
However, it is naive to believe that this alone will address the problem, as our
choices about food rarely attain an adequate level of autonomy. Empirical studies
draw attention to the power of social and cultural influences upon our choices as
well as the role of non-rational situational influences (Mulvaney-Day and
Womack 2009). It follows that where we regulate to help ensure that the food
people eat is healthy, we will rarely be overriding preferences which are
adequately autonomous. So even where the intention of food regulation is
paternalistic, this may well be justifiable (Nys 2008). Moreover, the people who
are most likely to come to harm through the liberty to eat TFs are those who are
already badly off. Hence, pace Resnik, giving citizens the liberty to choose things
that we have reason to think bad for them will tend to exacerbate inequality
(Arneson 2005).
3. Weighing Liberty Against Health
Resnik argues that we should weigh liberty against public health according to the
principles for public health regulation that Childress et al. (2002) lay out, namely:
effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement, and public
justification. Resnik allows that banning TFs from restaurants would be effective,
proportional, and could be publicly justified. However, he argues that such a ban
is nonetheless currently illegitimate because it would not meet either the criterion
of necessity or the criterion of the least restrictive alternative. TF bans fail to
comply with these criteria, he argues, because there are other less restrictive
measures, viz mandatory labelling and public education, which could be effective6
in reducing TF intake, and therefore we cannot say that it is necessary to ban TFs
from restaurants.
However, Resnik’s argument is weak. The necessity criterion simply asks us to
consider whether there are other ways of regulating a particular public health risk
which have a better balance of moral benefits over moral costs. Costs to liberty
are only one of the relevant factors. The very probable large costs to human life
through waiting and seeing whether education and labelling policies are effective
ways of reducing trans fat intake is also a relevant factor. Resnik provides no
reason to think that the moral costs associated with these very probable deaths are
smaller than those associated with the infringement of liberty.
Moreover, invoking the “principle of the least restrictive alternative” in public
health regulation seems to be either almost entirely superfluous, or to involve an
illicit form of double counting. If it means that we should adopt the least
restrictive alternative out of the ones that have already been singled out as offering
the best balance of moral benefits over moral costs, then presumably it can only
operate as a tie-breaker, and so will be unable to do the work Resnik requires.
i But
if it is supposed to play a substantive role (as Resnik seems to imagine it will),
then it seems to be clearly illicit, given that liberty has already been weighed in
the balance against the other goods at the stage of working out which policies are
proportional and necessary. Liberty is an important value, but it is not so
important that it ought to be counted multiple times.
Conclusion
We have argued that Resnik overvalues liberty in three distinct ways. First, he
fails to consider some powerful arguments for thinking that the state ought to7
intervene to create a safe environment for its citizens. Second, he overestimates
the degree to which food choices are autonomous. Third, he puts his thumb on the
scales when he comes to weigh liberty against protection of the health of the
public. Giving liberty its due -- but no more than its due -- would allow us to
adopt a more sensible policy, in which we ought to weigh the liberty to eat TFs
less heavily than the protection of thousands from early death through a simple
intervention that no member of the public will even notice.
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